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Abstract
The approach for a network behavior description in terms of numerical time-dependant
functions of the protocol parameters is suggested. This provides a basis for appli-
cation of methods of mathematical and theoretical physics for information flow
analysis on network and for extraction of patterns of typical network behavior. The
information traffic can be described as a trajectory in multi-dimensional parameter-
time space with dimension about 10-12. Based on this study some algorithms for
the proposed intrusion detection system are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Information systems are threatened today as never before. Evolving network
technologies have provided powerful information-transfer applications that
have increased our reliance on computerized information systems at the same
time that public access to the internet has increased the number and sophisti-
cation of those who seek to compromise these systems. The diversity of existing
software are hardware devices make the problem of the network the protection
very more difficult.
There are many approaches to study the attack tolerance of networks. These
approaches usually include the study of dependance of the network stability
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on the network complexity and topology (see, for example [1,2] and references
therein), and signature-based analysis technique and statistical analysis and
modelling of network traffic (see, for example [3–6]). Some methods to study
spatial traffic flows traversing the network [7] and correlation functions of ir-
regular sequences of numbers occurring in the operation of computer networks
[8] have been proposed recently.
In this paper we will not discuss properties related to network structure and
topology, but rather concentrate on the information flow on the network. The
main difference between this paper and the existing methods is that we are
interested in general properties of information flow on a network. We sug-
gest a new approach for network monitoring and intrusion detection based
on complete network monitoring. The term “complete” will be clarified later.
Since, the process of information exchange is extremely complicated for de-
tailed analysis, we apply some methods for analysis of complex systems in
physics to the information flow on networks. This gives us the powerful tools
for the analysis and provides a guideline for the application of the obtained
result for practical purposes.
We will start from a careful analysis of information exchange on networks to
choose the appropriate method of the information flow description. It will give
us the basis for network simulations in terms of mathematical description of
information exchange processes. Also, the understanding of information flow
on the network is necessary for real time network monitoring and for solutions
of difficult problems of intrusion detection[9] in real time.
2 Information flow description
To describe the information flow on a network, we work on the level of packets
exchanging between computers. The structure of the packets and their sizes
vary from each to another and depend on the process. In general each packet
consists from a header and attached (encapsulated) data. Since the data part
does not affect the packet propagation through the network we consider in this
paper only information included in headers. We recall that the header consists
of encapsulated protocols related to different layers of communications: from
a link layer to an application layer. The information contained in the headers
controls all network traffic. To extract this information one can use tcpdump
utilities, developed with the standard of LBNL’s Network Research Group
[10]. This information is used to analyze network traffic, to find a signature of
abnormal network behavior and to detect possible intrusions.
The important difference of the proposed approach from traditionally used
methods is the presentation of information contained in headers in terms of
2
well-defined mathematical functions. To do that we have developed software
to read binary tcpdump files and to represent all protocol parameters as cor-
responding time-dependent functions. This gives us the opportunity to ana-
lyze complete information (or a chosen fraction of complete information: a
combination of some parameters) for a chosen time and time window. The
ability to vary the time window for the analysis is important since it gives the
possibility to extract different scales in the time dependance of the system.
Different scales have different sensitivities for particular modes of the system
development and, for an example, could be sensitive to different methods of
intrusions.
It should be noted that not all parameters are reliable for the description of
the information flow. The protocol parameters for host-to-host communication
could be divided into two separate groups[11] in respect to the preservation or
changing of their values during the packet propagation through the network.
We call these two groups of parameters as dynamic and static. The dynamic
parameters may be changed during the packet propagation through the net-
work (internet). For example, a “physical” address of a computer, which is
the MAC parameter of the Ethernet protocol, is a dynamic parameter be-
cause it can be changed if the packet has been re-directed by a router. On the
other hand, the source IP address is an example of static parameter because
it does not change its value during the packet propagation. To describe the
information flow, we use only static parameters since they may carry intrinsic
properties of the information flow neglecting the network (internet) structure.
Now, using packets as a fundamental objects for information exchange on net-
work and being able to describe them in terms of functions of time for static
parameters, we can apply methods, developed in physics and applied mathe-
matics to study complex dynamical systems, for the network traffic analysis.
To demonstrate the power of these methods we recall an important result for
future applications which has been obtained in the framework of the presented
approach. It was shown[11] that to describe the information flow on network
one can use a small number (10 - 12) of parameters. In other words, the dimen-
sion of the information flow space is less or equal to 12 and the information
flow properties are independent on network structure, size and topology. To
estimate the dimension of the information flow on the network one can apply
the algorithm for analysis observed chaotic data in physical systems suggested
in paper[12](see also ref.[13]and references therein). The main idea is related
to the fact that any dynamical system with dimension N can be described by
the set of N differential equations of the second order in configuration space
or by the set of 2N differential equations of first order in phase space.
Assuming that the information flow can be described in terms of ordinary
differential equations (or by discrete-time evolution rules) for some unknown
3
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Fig. 1. Protocol type ID in the IP protocol as a function of time (in τ = 5sec units).
functions in a (parametric) phase space, one can analyze a time dependance of
given scalar parameter s(t) which is related to the system dynamics (see, for
details ref.[11]). Then one can build d-dimensional vectors from the variable s
as
yd(n) = [s(n), s(n+ T ), s(n+ 2T ), . . . , s(n+ T (d− 1))] (1)
at equal-distant time intervals T : s(t) → s(T · n) ≡ s(n), where n is inte-
ger number to numerate s values at different time. Now one can calculate a
number of nearest neighbors in the vicinity of each point in the vector space
and plot the dependance of the number of false nearest neighbors(FNN) as
a function of time. The false nearest neighbors for the d-dimensional space
are neighbors which move far away when we increase dimension from d to
d + 1. This algorithm could be illustrated by the simple example for a two-
dimensional circle. If we project the circle on one-dimensional space, we get
interval with two degenerated points along the projection axis. Increasing the
dimension by 1 we come to the original two-dimensional circle without the
degeneracy. Thus, the degenerated points in 1-dimension which have moved
to the opposite sides of the circle in 2-dimensions could be called a false near-
est neighbors (FNN). Unfolding the space further, to 3-dimension, and further
we will not get a false nearest neighbors anymore since a higher dimensional
space covers the two-dimensional space to which the circle belongs.
The typical behavior a scalar parameter and corresponding FNN plot are
shown on Figs. (1) and (2). From the last plot one can see that the number
of false nearest neighbors rapidly decreases up to about 10 or 12 dimensions.
After that it shows a slow, if any dependance at all, on the dimension. This
reflects the fact that by increasing the dimension d step-by-step, the number
of false nearest neighbors (FNN), which come due to projection of far away
parts of the trajectory in higher dimensional space, is decreasing up to the
4
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Fig. 2. Relative number of false nearest neighbors as a function of dimension of
unfolded space.
level restricted by the system noise since the noise has infinite dimension.
The analysis of information flow on network has been done in paper[11] for a
wide set of different network configurations and it was shown that it’s is about
10 or 12. It means one needs not more than 12 independent parameters for
a complete description of the information flow and that its dynamics can be
described as a trajectory in a phase space with the dimension about 10 - 12. It
is also important that this dimension does not depend on the network topology,
its size, and the operating systems involved in the network. Therefore, this
characteristic is an universal and may be applied for any network.
However, we do not know these independent parameters. Moreover, due to the
complexity of the system it is natural that these unknown parameters, which
are real dynamical degrees of freedom, have very complicated relations with
the parameters contained in the network protocols. Fortunately, these tech-
nique provide very powerful methods to extract general information about
behavior of dynamical complex systems. For example, the obtained time de-
pendence of only one parameter, the protocol ID, shown on Fig.(1) is enough
to reconstruct the trajectory of the information flow in its phase space. The
projection of the trajectory on 3-dimensional space is shown on Fig. (3), and
further three projections of the trajectory on the 2-dimensional spaces are
shown on Fig.(4). One can see that the complete description of the network
information traffic in terms of small number of parameters is possible and the
the trajectory of information flow is rather well localized and will be a subject
for further analysis and pattern recognition techniques.
Now we can obtain results for developing an approach to monitor the network
in real time and to prevent possible intrusions.
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Fig. 3. The projection of the trajectory of the information flow 3-dimensional phase
space.
Fig. 4. The 2-dimensional projections of the trajectory represented on Fig.(3).
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3 Real Time Network Monitoring and Detection of Known Intru-
sions
The direct consequences of the proposed approach for the network traffic de-
scription provides the possibility of a real time network monitoring and detec-
tion of all known network attacks. This is because the complete information
about network traffic at any given point of the network is collected from tcp-
dump binary output. All header parameters are converted into time dependant
numerical functions. Therefore, each packet for host-to-host exchange corre-
sponds to a point in the multidimensional parametric phase space. The set
of these points (the trajectory) completely describes information transfer on
the network. It is clear that this representation provides not only the total
description of the network traffic at the given point but rather a powerful
tool for analysis in real time. Let us consider some possible scenarios for the
analysis.
Suppose we are looking for known network intrusions. The signature of the
intrusion is a special set of relations between the header parameters. For exam-
ple[9], the signature for the attempt to identify live hosts by those responding
to the ACK scan includes a source address, an ACK and SYN flags from
TCP protocol, a target address of internal network, sequences number, and
source and destination port numbers. The lone ACK flag set with identical
source and destination ports is the signature for the ACK scan, since the lone
ACK flag set should be found only as the final transmission of the three-way
handshake, an acknowledgement of receiving data, or data that is transmitted
where the entire sending buffer has not been emptied. From this example one
can see that the intrusion signature could be easily formulated in terms of
logic rules and corresponding equations. Then, collecting the header parame-
ters (this is the initial phase of network monitoring) and testing sets of them
against the signatures (functions in terms of the subset of the parameters)
one can filter out all known intrusions. Since we can collect any set of the
parameters and easily add any signature function, it provides the way for a
continuous upgrading of the intrusion detection system (IDS) built on these
principles. In other words, such ID system is universal and can be used to
detect all possible network intrusions by adding new filter functions or macros
in the existing testing program. It is very flexible and easily upgradable. The
flexibility is important, however, and in principle could be achieved even in
existing “traditional” IDS’s. What is out of scope of traditional approaches
is the minimization of possible false alarms and maximal optimized and con-
trolled sensitivity to intrusion signals. These features are an intrinsic feature
of our approach.
The important feature of the approach is the presentation of the parameters in
terms of time dependant functions. This gives the opportunity to decrease the
7
false alarm probability of the IDS as best possible for the particular network.
This can be done using sophisticated methods already developed for noise
reduction in time series. Moreover, representation of the protocol parameters
as numerical functions provides the opportunity for detailed mathematical
analysis and, as a consequence, for the optimization of the signal-to-noise ratio
using not only time series techniques but also numerical methods for analysis
of multi-dimensional functions. The combination of these methods provides
the best possible way, in terms of accuracy of the algorithms and reliability of
the obtained information, for detection of known intrusions in real time.
Also, the description of the information flow in terms of numerical functions
gives the opportunity to monitor the network traffic for different time win-
dows without missing information and without overflowing storage facilities.
One can suggest some different ways to do it. One example is the use of a par-
allel computer environment (such as low cost powerful Linux clusters) for the
simultaneous analysis of the decoded binary tcpdump output. In this case the
numerical functions of the header parameters, being sent to different nodes
of the cluster, will be analyzed by each node using similar algorithms but
different scales for time averaging of signals (or functions). Thus each node
has separate time window and, therefore, is sensitive to the network behav-
ior in the particular range of time. Choosing time averaging scales for the
nodes from microseconds to weeks, for example, one can trace and analyze
the network traffic independently and simultaneously in all these time win-
dows. It is worthwhile to remember that the optimal signal-to-noise ratio is
achieved for each time window independently providing the best possible level
of information traffic analysis for the whole network. There are at least three
obvious advantages for this approach. The first one is the possibility to detect
intrusions developed on different time scales simultaneously and in real time.
The second one is the automatic decreasing of the noise from a short time
fluctuations for long time windows due to time averaging. This provides de-
tailed information analysis in each time window without lost information and,
at the same time, discards all noise related information, drastically reducing
the amount of information at the storage facilities. The third advantage is the
possibility to use (in real time) output from short time scale analyzed data as
an additional information for the long time scale analysis.
Let us estimate how many parameters are used to describe signatures of cur-
rently known intrusions. One analyzes the comprehensive (but probably not a
complete) list of known attacks: smurf [14], fraggle [15], pingpong [16], ping of
death [17], IP Fragment overlap [18], BrKill [19], land attack [20], SYN flood
attack [21], TCP session hijacking [22], out of band bug [23], IP unaligned
timestamp [24], bonk [25], OOB data barf [26] and vulnerability scans (FIN
and SYN & FIN scanning) [27]. The frequencies of the parameters involved
in signatures for these intrusions are shown on Fig.(5) and the numeration of
the parameters is explained in Table 1. One can see that the small number of
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Table 1
The parameters involved in intrusion signatures as shown on Fig.(5).
Number Protocol Parameter Frequency
1 IP Destination IP Address 3
2 IP Source IP Address 1
3 IP Length 1
4 IP More Fragment Flag 2
5 IP Don’t Fragment Flag 2
6 IP Options 1
7 TCP Source Port 1
8 TCP Destination Port 1
9 TCP Urgent Flag 1
10 TCP RST Flag 1
11 TCP ACK Flag 2
12 TCP SYN Flag 2
13 TCP FIN Flag 1
14 UDP Destination Port 2
15 UDP Source Port 1
16 ICMP Type 2
17 ICMP Code 2
parameters that are used for signatures of intrusions. This fact simplifies the
procedure of the analysis.
4 Detection of Unknown Intrusions
The suggested approach could be considered as a powerful and promising
method for network monitoring and detection of known network intrusions.
However, there is an even more important feature: the ability to detect pre-
viously unknown attacks on a network in a wide range of time scales. This
ability is based on the method of description of information exchange on net-
works in terms of the exchange of packets provided by the header parameters
as described in terms of numerical functions of time (or a trajectory in multi-
dimensional phase space) as well as on existing methods in theoretical physics
for the analysis of dynamics of complex systems. These methods lead to a
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Fig. 5. Frequencies of the parameters used in signatures of intrusions. For numbering
rules see Table 1.
very useful result for the dimensionality of the information flow space. Since
the number of parameters used in packet header is high (of the order of hun-
dreds), the practical search for unknown (even abnormal) signal would be a
difficult problem if possible at all. Therefore, the reported result [11] on the
small dimension of the parametric space of the information flow is a crucial
point for the practical approach for the detection of unknown intrusions.
To build a real time intrusion detection system, which is capable of detecting
unknown attacks, we exploit the fact that one needs to analyze only a small
number of parameters. Furthermore, as it is known from complex systems the-
ory, the choice of the parameters is not important unless they are sensitive to
the system behavior. The last statement needs to be explained in more detail.
Generally, hundreds different parameters could be encapsulated in the pack-
ets headers. The question is which parameters we need to choose for the right
description of the information flow. One can think, following the discussion in
the previous section, that we need to make our choice from the known quoted
17 parameters. It may be a good guess. However, the number 17 is bigger
than the dimension of the phase space which we are taking in mind, and it
could be a suspicion that hackers will invent new attacks with new signature
parameters which are not included in the set presented in the previous section.
The right answer on these remarks follows from complex systems theory: for
complete system description one needs only the number of parameters equal
to the phase space dimension (more precisely, the smallest integer number
which is larger than fractal dimension of the phase space). It could be set
of any parameters which are sensitive to the system dynamics (and the 17
discussed parameters could be good candidates). We do not know, and do not
suppose to know, the real set of parameters until the theory of network infor-
mation flow is developed or a reliable model for information flow description
is suggested. Nevertheless, a method developed to study non-linear complex
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systems provides tools to extract the essential information about the system
from the analysis of even a small partial set of the “sensitive” parameters.
As an example, one can refer to the Fig.(3) which show the 3-dimensional
projection of the reconstructed trajectory from the time dependent behavior
of only one parameter (the protocol ID) shown on Fig.(1). It means that the
complete description of the network information flow could be obtained even
from one “sensitive” parameter.
It should be noted that it is certainly not enough to analyze one parameter
for intrusion detection in realistic situation. In the worst case, some analysis
can be done using one parameter, but the reliability, signal-to-noise ratio and
time efficiency of the analysis will be rather poor for it to be used as a search
for an unknown attack. However, the above extreme example demonstrates
the power of the method. The proper approach is to use as many parameters
as possible (up to the dimension of the phase space). In that case one can
reach the optimal sensitivity to an intrusion signal and speed up the analysis
procedure.
One of the ways to the realize this approach is to use the multi-window method
discussed in the previous section with the proper data analysis for each time
scale. The method of analysis is out of the scope of the current paper and will
be reported elsewhere. We will review only the general idea and the problems
related to this analysis. To detect unknown attacks (unusual network behav-
ior) we use a deviation of signals from the normal regular network behavior.
For these purposes one can use a pattern recognition technique: as well to
establish a normal behavior patterns so as to measure a possible deviation
from the normal pattern. However, the pattern recognition problem is quite
difficult for this analysis. According to our knowledge, it is technically im-
possible to achieve reliable efficiency in pattern recognition for rather large,
such as a 10 dimensional space. On other hand, for our purposes, we cannot
extract reliable information from the analysis of one parameter. Therefore,
one can choose the optimal (compromised) solution to use pattern recognition
technique in the informational flow subspaces with low dimensions. One can
choose these subspaces as cross sections of the total phase space defined by
applying appropriate constraints on some header parameters. In this case, we
will have reasonable ratio of signal-to-noise and will simplify and also improve
reliability for the pattern recognition technique. For pattern recognition we
suggest useing a 2-3 dimensional wavelet analysis chosen on basis of detailed
study of the information traffic on the set of networks. The wavelet approach
is promising because it simultaneously drastically reduces the computational
time and memory requirements (which is very important for multidimensional
analysis) and because it can be used for additional effective noise reduction
technique.
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5 Conclusions
We suggest a new approach for real time network monitoring which is based
on the application of complex systems theory for information flow analysis
on networks. The synthesis of the network traffic description, in terms of
numerical time dependant functions, and methods of theoretical physics, for
the study of complex systems, provides not only a robust method for network
monitoring with detection of known intrusions, but it looks very promising for
developing real systems for detection of unknown intrusions.
To apply innovative technology approaches that are measurably effective against
practical attacks it is necessary to detect and identify the attack on reconnais-
sance stage. As an element for the future technology we presented the study
of the possibility of building an automatic intrusion detector system, based on
new methods of data analysis and pattern recognition. The system will be able
to help maintain a high level of confidence in the protection of the networks.
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